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Abstract 
During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programs. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ 
success in implementing these programs. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk 
perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This paper uses fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success 
prospects of austerity programs during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF 
evaluations are heavily influenced by the program’s implementation credibility. They require a 
tractable policy problem, a country’s institutional capacity to structure implementation, and 
favor expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to 
fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policymaking through 
its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programs that need to be implemented swiftly are 
evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF program.  
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This paper analyzes on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity 
programs during the European debt crisis. The level of debt in developed European countries 
has risen sharply in recent years. To avoid spiraling debt and refinance existing debts on the 
capital markets under acceptable conditions, numerous states have adopted austerity programs. 
Austerity programs aim to balance the fiscal budget by reducing expenditure and increasing 
revenue, hence constituting one way to achieve fiscal consolidation (Blyth 2013; IMF 1995). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), often described as one of the most powerful IOs in 
history (Bird 2007; Nelson 2014; Stone 2002), “accompanies” countries on the road to fiscal 
consolidation. Throughout this process, it influences domestic fiscal policy in important ways 
(Ban 2015; Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Fang & Stone 2012; Woods 2006). Besides providing 
policy advice to member countries, the IMF also evaluates the countries’ likely performance in 
implementing austerity policies, and communicates the results (Dreher, Marchesi & Vreeland 
2008; IMF 2015a, b, c; Lombardi & Woods 2008). The IMF’s evaluations of countries’ 
austerity programs – a key element in the IMF’s bilateral surveillance activities – are influential 
signals to capital markets on how risky certain sovereigns are in terms of investment (Ban & 
Gallagher 2015; Dreher et al. 2008; IMF 2015c). If the IMF does not consider a country’s road 
to fiscal adjustment credible, this results in an increased risk perception on capital markets 
(Fratzscher & Reynaud 2011).  
Despite the huge relevance of IMF austerity program evaluations, little is known about their 
reasoning. The main thrust of research on IMF-decision-making has focused on the Fund’s 
lending activities, but paid little attention to surveillance activities (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 
Dreher & Gassebner 2012; Pop-Eleches 2008; Steinwand & Stone 2008; Stone 2004). 
However, as the IMF’s new raison d'être is surveillance (Dreher et al. 2008), the question of 
how the IMF exerts power on its member states – not only by direct means such as formal 
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enforcement mechanisms, but also indirectly through the narrowing of policy advice and 
options – has taken on a new dimension (Broome & Seabrooke 2012).  
As arguably the first study that examines the IMF’s recent stance towards austerity in the 
context of its surveillance activities in the Eurozone, this paper asks: how did the IMF assess 
austerity programs during the European debt crisis? We adopt a public policy perspective and 
assume that Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980) seminal framework of the implementation 
process helps us understand IMF evaluations (e.g., Exadaktylos & Zahariadis 2014). Employing 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2008), we assess how different 
constellations of the interplay of problem tractability, the ability of the austerity program to 
structure implementation, and non-statutory variables affected the IMF’s evaluation of 20 
austerity programs implemented in 14 countries of the Eurozone or the European Union (EU) 
during the recent debt crisis.  
This paper contributes to the debate on IMF evaluations in three ways. First, it analyzes 
developed European countries. Earlier work has focused on low- and middle-income transition 
and developing countries and emphasized the IMF’s responsiveness to geopolitical and 
transnational business interest (Aldenhoff 2007; Dreher et. al. 2008; Fratzscher & Reynaud 
2011; Pop-Eleches 2009; Thacker 1990). This perspective has largely neglected the “domestic 
variables that influence whether or not a government adopts an IO’s policy preferences” 
(Broome & Seabrooke 2012: 2). Indeed, findings on the IMF’s loan negotiations and lending 
decisions (Broome 2010; Chwieroth 2013; Stone 2002; Woods 2006) suggest that particularly 
in the institutionally and politically more stable context of the Eurozone, domestic variables 
should affect how the IMF evaluates austerity programs (Heller 2002). Second, contrary to 
these previous studies, we focus on IMF evaluations within the context of formal assessments 
of austerity programs which provide information signals about sovereign risk to capital markets. 
Finally, our analysis focuses on recently issued austerity programs. Since 2008, the IMF began 
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to reconsider its understanding of a “sound fiscal policy” and its stance towards austerity and 
stimulus measures. It increasingly recommended a more gradual implementation of austerity 
measures for countries with sufficient confidence on financial markets (Blanchard & Leigh 
2013) and a more balanced mix of expenditure reduction and revenue increases (Ban 2015). 
Given this altered stance towards austerity, the assumption that the IMF acts as a fierce and 
undifferentiated agent of austerity made in much work on the European debt crisis may prove 
to be too narrow. Clearly, a more differentiated stance towards austerity by the IMF asks for an 
in-depth examination of the factors that influence that stance. 
In fact, our results show that the IMF is not an undifferentiated agent of austerity, but considers 
domestic conditions. IMF evaluations prove to be heavily influenced by implementation 
credibility. First, for rather uncompetitive countries with lower institutional capacity and 
ambitious austerity programs, it is almost impossible to take the road to fiscal adjustment 
without being involved in an IMF rescue program. Second, the IMF negatively evaluates 
economically stronger countries whose adjustment policies do not conform to the IMF’s 
preference of expenditure reduction over revenue measures. These findings suggest that the 
IMF acts as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, indirectly influencing member states’ 
scope of policymaking through its surveillance activities.  
Next, we discuss the IMF’s evaluations of austerity programs and outline our explanatory 
model. We then proceed to the research design and methods employed. After presenting the 
results, we go on to discuss the main findings and their implications. 
The Politics of External Approval 
The IMF has recently begun to gradually shift its primary focus from lending to surveillance 
activities. Accordingly, scholars seek to understand how surveillance works and what 
implications it has for member countries. Particular focus has been placed on the forecasts of 
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fiscal and macroeconomic variables of member countries which are published on a regular 
basis.  
Although IMF forecasts are known to be based on a strong scientific culture (Ban & Gallagher 
2015), the IMF publishes only vague information on these procedures and schematically 
describes the preceding consultation processes (Asdorian 2015; IMF 2015b, c): “the initial 
projections are based on an econometric model. Subsequently, however, there is much leeway 
for […] discretionary adjustments” (Dreher et al. 2008: 146).  IMF evaluations contain a 
substantive qualitative element resulting from the considerable subjectivity of the respective 
country teams (IMF 2015b, c). While earlier research scrutinized the accuracy of forecasts 
(Pons 2000; Timmermann 2007), few scholars have recently analyzed their determinants 
(Aldenhoff 2007; Dreher et. al. 2008; Fratzscher & Reynaud 2011). These studies have found 
a low explanatory power of political strategies and macroeconomic variables, while quite 
unambiguously suggesting that the IMF both legitimizes its lending activities with overly 
optimistic forecasts, and favors countries that are political allies of the United States of America 
(US) (Aldenhoff 2007; Dreher et al. 2008). In emerging market economies, the countries’ 
political power has also proven relevant (Fratzscher & Reynaud 2011).  
We argue that in the context of the contemporary Eurozone, domestic variables that influence 
a country’s implementation credibility matter for IMF austerity program evaluations. While the 
geopolitical and strategic interests of the IMF’s principals set the broader boundaries for IMF-
decision-making (Stone 2002; Thacker 1990), within these boundaries, the IMF has acquired 
considerable maneuvering space (Chwieroth 2013; Pop-Eleches 2009; Woods 2006). Whereas 
IMF evaluations may be commercially more sensitive towards systemic economic entities like 
the Eurozone than to low- and middle-income transition and developing economies, this factor 
alone cannot explain the considerable variation in IMF austerity program evaluations within the 
Eurozone. Geopolitical arguments also cannot be the main difference-maker in the European 
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context: the IMF has negatively rated the austerity programs of powerful US-friendly countries 
like Germany and the United Kingdom. Finally, the IMF has expressed its intention to 
strengthen the traction of surveillance by ensuring its quality, candor, and evenhandedness (IMF 
2011: 19; 2014), which should also enhance the relevance of domestic variables.  
When a country announces an austerity program, this can be interpreted as a signal of its 
willingness for fiscal adjustment. IMF publications clearly indicate that the IMF does not take 
these signals at face value, but subjects them to a “reality-check” to verify them for their 
implementation credibility (Heller 2002). Our aim is to evaluate the IMF’s response to the 
announcement of an austerity program, specifically, whether the IMF deems the program 
capable of meeting its objective. The IMF regularly publishes forecasts for estimated budget 
balances in its Fiscal Monitor (FM) (Ban & Gallagher 2015; IMF 2015a, b). The outcome we 
seek to explain is the IMF’s evaluation of an austerity program’s likely success in balancing the 
budget as intended, hereinafter referred to as “positive evaluation” (POS). To capture this, we 
compare the fiscal balance targeted by the austerity program, on the one hand, with the fiscal 
balance (general government structural balance) projection after the announcement of an 
austerity program, on the other.1 
 
-- insert Figure 1 here – 
 
                                                 
 
 
1 To ensure that announced austerity programs were actually incorporated in the projections, we chose a time span 
of approximately 4-6 weeks between announcement and data publication by the IMF. In case of doubt, we opted 
for the later Fiscal Monitor update. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the IMF’s forecasts of changes in the countries’ fiscal balance after 
implementation vary considerably between different austerity programs. If the IMF forecasts 
that the program is likely to miss the target, then the evaluation is more negative than positive. 
For instance, by the end of 2010, Ireland announced its intention to meet the EU deficit criteria 
of -3% of GDP until 2014. However, considering the planned austerity measures, the IMF 
projected the deficit to be at -4.8%. Hence, the IMF expected Ireland to miss its target by 1.8 
percentage points. If the IMF projects that the program will not miss its intended target (score 
of 0 or more), then the program is more positively than negatively evaluated. The Slovak 
Republic, for instance, announced an austerity program in May 2012, with the aim of bringing 
its budget deficit down to 3% by 2013. In response, the IMF expected the program to exceed 
its goal by +0.1 percentage points and projected the deficit to be 2.9% after implementation. 
The observed evaluations range from +1,4 to -3.7. It is these differences that we now scrutinize. 
On what grounds can the IMF reasonably assess? 
When announcing austerity programs, countries must, as a minimum, define the total amount 
of savings, the expected duration, and cost saving efforts in order to obtain funds and reasonable 
credit terms. However, most austerity programs under scrutiny outlined these parameters too 
vaguely to ensure their successful implementation. The IMF was therefore well-advised to treat 
these indications as a mere declaration of intent, whose implementation credibility required 
verification. Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980) framework captures the way austerity measures 
as centrally designed top-level policy decisions, often imposed under external pressure, are 
implemented particularly well (e.g., Exadaktylos & Zahariadis 2014). We adapt that framework 
to the specific research context by integrating explanatory factors mentioned more or less 
explicitly by the IMF. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) understand the implementation of public 
policies to be the result of the interplay between three main sets of factor. First, the tractability 
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of the problem at hand is captured here as program ambitiousness and the presence of an IMF 
rescue program. Second, the ability of the statute to structure implementation is influenced by 
the number of veto players and the effectiveness of the national administration. Third, we 
consider the presence of a strong Centre-Right government and a country’s economic 
competitiveness as non-statutory variables affecting implementation.  
Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980: 554) model should be understood as a “minimum list of 
crucial conditions”, rather than as individual factors which work in isolation. We want to 
discover case-specific configurations that explain how the IMF evaluates austerity programs. 
Surprising results then provide opportunities for further explorations to refine theory (Rihoux 
& Ragin 2009). While adopting an explorative focus, we seek to identify theoretically plausible 
counterfactual arguments when dealing with limited diversity (that not all logically possible 
combinations of relevant causal conditions exist in the real world). To this end, we formulate 
directional expectations on the effects of single variables. These expectations serve as 
counterfactual arguments and are not testable hypotheses (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
295ff). 
Problem tractability  
First, the greater the amount of behavioral change required, the more problematic a program’s 
successful implementation becomes (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980: 544). The ambitiousness of 
the adopted program (AMB) sets the size of the envisaged deficit reduction in relation to the 
time countries had at their disposal to achieve the deficit reduction. Programs are ambitious if 
the country envisaged a large budget reduction within a brief period of time. This might indicate 
low implementation credibility to the IMF: ambitious programs could be mere “paper tigers” 
that promise an unrealistically severe and swift fiscal change. Conversely, the IMF might also 
value high ambitiousness as the appropriate austerity measure, indicating that a country takes 
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its austerity plans seriously. Since program ambitiousness could indicate both high and low 
success prospects, no directional expectation is formulated. 
Second, two reasons make us assume that the IMF rates austerity programs more positively in 
countries where it is engaged with a rescue program (PRG) (IMF 2015b). First, there is strong 
evidence that the IMF engages in “defensive forecasting”: a negative evaluation would weaken 
the credibility of the IMF program. Positive evaluations can also increase the probability that 
those loans are repaid (Aldenhoff 2007; Dreher et al. 2008). Second, the presence of an IMF 
program signals a country's willingness and ability to undertake substantive reform (Fratzscher 
& Reynaud 2011: 407). Countries with IMF arrangements in place have already undergone a 
‘screening’ process that allows the IMF to better estimate the country’s ability to fulfill its 
policy commitments (Chwieroth 2013). Less uncertainty could positively affect IMF 
evaluations. Moreover, loan disbursements during an IMF program are conditional on 
demonstrable policy actions, which provides the IMF with opportunities to directly influence, 
monitor and enforce policy design and compliance (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Broome, 
2015; IMF 2015d). 
Ability of the statute to structure implementation 
Third, implementation success is determined by the number of veto/clearance points involved 
in the attainment of statutory objectives (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980: 546). Austerity 
programs can entail severe and abrupt cuts affecting a wide range of players and giving rise to 
opposition. Central governments must make sure that “budgetary discipline is imposed on all 
fiscal entities” (Heller 2002: 18). A decentralized political system features a larger number of 
sub-national veto players whose opposition to painful austerity measures could potentially 
undermine the “flexible and responsive execution of the budget” (Huber, Ragin & Stephens 
1993; IMF 1995: 34; Tsebelis 1995). Thus, a high number of veto players in a country (DC) 
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should negatively affect the IMF’s evaluation of implementation credibility. 
Fourth, sufficient financial and personnel administrative resources are “necessary to hire the 
staff and to conduct the technical analyses involved in the development of regulations, the 
administration of permit programs, and the monitoring of compliance” (Sabatier & Mazmanian 
1980: 545). Established administrative capacities, e.g., a strong treasury, improve the efficient, 
thorough and successful implementation of austerity programs (Heller 2002: 17; IMF 1995). 
The existence of an effective administration (EFF) should thus positively affect the IMF’s 
evaluation of the austerity program.  
Non-statutory variables 
Fifth, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 574) highlight that “[a]ny new program requires 
implementors who are not merely neutral but sufficiently persistent to develop new regulations 
and standard operating procedures, and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target 
groups”. IMF evaluations entail a continuous “policy dialogue” between fund staff and national 
authorities (Lombardi & Woods 2008). Much of the existing literature has focused on the 
commitment of individual ‘sympathetic interlocutors’, i.e. “national policymakers who are 
sympathetic to advice from the IMF” (Broome & Seabrooke 2015: 6; Chwieroth 2015). We 
measure the political commitment of the whole government through partisan affiliation for three 
reasons. First, in developed countries, the IMF pays more attention to broader political support 
than to the presence of individual interlocutors (Woods 2006). Second, in situations like the 
European debt crisis marked by a very contentious economic problem and alternative ideology-
based interpretations and solutions, partisanship influences the IMF’s decision-making (Pop-
Eleches 2009). Third, in a European context key actors are not only socialized by the 
universities they attend, but also by their political parties. Due to their political commitment to 
a less comprehensive welfare state policy, conservative Centre-Right governments typically 
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support and implement austerity measures to a stronger degree than Centre-Left and Christian-
Democratic governments (Hibbs 1977). The former usually face less blame when cutting social 
policy (Giger & Nelson 2010). Accordingly, the presence of a strong Centre-Right government 
(CR) should positively affect the IMF’s evaluation of implementation credibility.2 
Sixth, as Bird (2007: 683) points out, “in order to understand the IMF’s operations, economics 
has to be combined with politics”. A relevant socio-economic condition is the competitiveness 
of the economy. Economic competitiveness describes the basic conditions for growth, 
innovation, and efficiency that determine how productively a country uses its available 
resources to provide future economic prosperity. Economically competitive states are more 
likely able to escape the debt spiral by generating economic growth and reducing both their 
debt burden and future pressure for savings. This, in turn, creates budgetary scope and increases 
the likelihood that budgetary targets are met (IMF 2015a). Thus, the countries’ high economic 
competitiveness (COM) should positively influence the IMF’s evaluation of success likelihood.  
Table 1 summarizes the six conditions and the directional expectations used for counterfactual 
arguments. Adopting QCA notation, the presence of a factor is indicated with uppercase letters, 
and its absence with lowercase letters.  
 
-- insert Table 1 here -- 
 
                                                 
 
 
2 We account for the “policy dialogue” influencing the IMF’s assessment of political commitment during our case 
discussions below. During regular Article IV meetings, the IMF tries to grasp the political commitment of country 
officials for announced fiscal policies (Lombardi & Woods 2008). 
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Data and methods 
We assess 20 austerity programs introduced in 14 countries within the Eurozone or the EU since 
the crisis began between January 2009 and May 2012.3 This design holds important economic 
contextual factors constant: the countries share an internal market and have been undergoing a 
process of fiscal-political harmonization since the crisis began. Since they have the same 
currency, or their national currency is tied with the Euro, they cannot avoid consolidation 
measures by devaluing their currency without restriction.4 This enhances the importance of 
austerity programs.  
We employ Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2008; Rihoux & 
Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012) to identify necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
for a positive or negative evaluation by the IMF (software: QCA R package). The underlying 
assumption of causal complexity has three elements. Equifinality means that various scenarios 
can induce the same IMF evaluation. Conjunctural causation indicates that case-specific factors 
affect IMF evaluation in combination rather than in isolation (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980). 
Lastly, asymmetrical causation means that different causal factors may matter for a positive 
IMF evaluation than for a negative IMF evaluation. Case knowledge enables us to identify 
potential measurement errors (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 89, 295-305, 307-312). 
fsQCA conceives of variables as sets in which cases have membership or not. The attribution 
of cases to sets is called calibration. Qualitative anchors determine the stage at which the 
                                                 
 
 
3 In the absence of any official document listing austerity programs passed in the EU, cases were identified using 
Internet-based research. National and international news services were consulted to verify that the announced 
austerity program had actually been adopted. 
4 This includes the UK or Denmark, who cannot avoid internal devaluation at the expense of currency devaluation. 
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condition is deemed fully present (fuzzy value ≥ 0.95), fully absent (fuzzy value ≤ 0.05) and an 
indifference point at 0.5. The latter establishes the difference in kind: for example, fuzzy 
membership values in POS above 0.5 means that IMF evaluation was rather or fully positive 
(POS), while values below 0.5 indicate that the evaluation was rather or fully negative (pos).  
fsQCA uses the logical operators OR (+) and AND (*). The latter depicts combinations of 
conditions, referred to hereinafter as configurations or paths. A “truth table” shows all possible 
combinations of conditions. If all or enough cases’ fuzzy set membership in a truth table row is 
smaller than or equal to its membership in the outcome, then the row is identified as a sufficient 
path for the outcome. The logical minimization process identifies the shortest expression for 
those factors that imply () the outcome – the solution term.  
fsQCA results are evaluated using two main parameters of fit that range from 0-1. The 
appropriate levels for these parameters are research-specific but are better the closer they are to 
1 (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 128). Consistency indicates the extent to which the results 
are in line with the statements of necessity or sufficiency, which is weakened by “deviant cases 
consistency in kind” with qualitatively different membership in the explanation and the 
outcome (Schneider & Rohlfing 2013). The proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) 
indicates the degree to which a configuration is not simultaneously sufficient for both outcomes. 
Consistency should not be below 0.75 for sufficient conditions, and 0.9 for necessary conditions 
(Ragin 2008: 46). The presence of “gaps” and deviant cases consistency in kind helped us 
determine raw consistency thresholds for single truth table rows. Coverage then states how well 
the available empirical information is explained by the condition(s). For sufficient conditions, 
raw coverage indicates how much a single path covers, while unique coverage indicates how 
much it uniquely covers. For necessary conditions, coverage expresses their relevance in terms 
of not being much larger than the outcome, and the Relevance of Necessity (RoN), in terms of 
the condition being close to a constant (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 128, 139, 235-239).  
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Applying the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) procedure, we make theoretically informed 
directional expectations about empirically unobserved configurations (Table 1) and ensure that 
the coding of the outcome in the truth table does not contradict prior findings of necessity or 
sufficiency (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 198-211). The datasets, descriptive statistics, the 
truth tables, directional expectations, conservative and parsimonious solution terms, 
simplifying assumptions and r codes for replication are all indicated in the online appendix.  
Operationalization and calibration  
We now turn to the measurement and calibration of the condition and outcome sets, using the 
current values at the time of the announcement of the austerity program (Table 2). The 
calibration decisions are outlined in detail together with extensive robustness tests in online 
appendix B (Skaaning 2011).  
Highly ambitious program (AMB). Austerity programs are ambitious if they need to achieve a 
large deficit reduction within too little time to be realistically implemented. To measure 
ambitiousness, we divide the planned deficit reduction in per cent of GDP by the duration of 
the austerity program in months. For instance, while Portugal’s first austerity program sought 
to bring the deficit down from -7.3% to -4.6% of GDP almost within a year, the Czech program 
aimed at reducing the deficit from -3.5% to 0% within four years. The resulting scale has a 
sample range from 0.6 (very high ambitiousness) to 0.01 (very low ambitiousness).  
Existence of an IMF program (PRG). Austerity programs in countries with an IMF program in 
place at the time of the announcement are coded with 1, all others, with 0 (dichotomous set).  
Strongly decentralized political system (DC). In decentralized political systems, sub-national 
jurisdictions have significant decision-making power concerning policy design and 
implementation and can make significant changes (e.g., in the timetable and broad parameters). 
By contrast, in centralized systems, sub-national units cannot significantly influence the design 
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and implementation of austerity measures, which results only in minor to austerity policies 
adjustments (e.g., local delays). The aggregated decentralization index developed by the 
Assembly of European Regions views decentralization as the sum of decision-making power 
and competencies of sub-national jurisdictions in various areas (scale from 0 to 100) (AER 
2009).  
Effective state administration (EFF). An effective state administration possesses the means and 
expertise to implement austerity measures thoroughly, on time and successfully. This is not the 
case if it lacks important resources and expertise necessary to translate austerity requirements 
into concrete policies and enforce their implementation. The Governance Indicator developed 
by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011) combines the quality of the public service, the 
political independence of the administration, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and other administration-related aspects into an index for government 
effectiveness that ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. Higher values correspond to greater government 
effectiveness.  
Strong Centre-Right government (CR). If the share of government-posts held by Centre-Right 
candidates is sufficiently large, Centre-Right candidates’ can exert a dominant influence on 
policymaking and implementation. We use the percentage share of (ministerial) posts held by 
Centre-Right parties in the government from the Comparative Political Data Set III 1990-2010 
of Armingeon et al. (2012) for operationalization.  
High economic competitiveness (COM). A high degree of competitiveness facilitates sound 
future growth and economic prosperity, as increased tax revenue creates budgetary leeway and 
alleviates the need for austerity in subsequent years. Conversely, low economic competitiveness 
heralds poor growth prospects and significantly limits the future budgetary scope. The Global 
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum aggregates data on basic conditions for 
growth, efficiency-boosting factors and innovation-boosting factors on a numerical scale which 
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can range from 2.7 to 5.8.  
 
-- insert Table 2 here -- 
Results 
Results reveal two necessary conditions for a positive evaluation by the IMF (for full results 
see Table A4 and Figure A1 online appendix). First, the IMF requires a country to possess the 
institutional capacity to structure the implementation of austerity measures in order to consider 
the latter feasible: whenever the IMF gave an austerity program a positive evaluation, either the 
political system tended to be centralized, or the state administration was effective (dc + EFF).  
A second prerequisite for the IMF to evaluate an austerity program positively is a tractable 
problem: either the austerity program has to be non-ambitious, or an ongoing IMF program is 
in place (amb + PRG). The existence of an IMF program might actually influence the program’s 
perceived ambitiousness: it reduces information asymmetries and enables the IMF to enforce 
maximum compliance instead of having to rely on persuasion (Fang & Stone 2012; IMF 
2015b).  
Table 3 presents the three paths that imply that the IMF grades austerity programs well. The 
single cases that are explained by this solution, the consistency and coverage indicators for the 
single paths and the overall solution are listed below. Cases can display several paths. We 
discuss typical cases for each path below.  
 
-- insert Table 3 here -- 
 
It is striking that a comparatively centralized political system is a necessary part of the story for 
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a positive evaluation. Paths 1 and 2 describe the “struggling, but manageable students”: 
austerity programs passed in countries with ineffective state administrations (eff), but which 
are comparatively centralized (dc) and with a direct involvement of the IMF (PRG). In the first 
path, this combined with low program ambitiousness (amb), and in path 2, with a strong Centre-
Right government (CR). In line with the “defensive forecasting” assertion, these cases are 
Greece and Portugal, where the IMF provided financial support and was directly involved in 
the implementation of agreed austerity measures. The IMF seems to be confident that its 
engagement in a country can bolster a weak state administration under favorable conditions 
marked by fewer veto points, reasonable consolidation targets, or a Centre-Right government 
that supports the austerity program. Whether this is due to the IMF’s closer grip on 
implementation, the improved availability of information, or a combination of these, could be 
addressed in future research by interviewing IMF officials about their motives. 
Another group of positively evaluated austerity programs entailed “model pupils” with 
comparatively unambitious programs (amb) adopted in economically competitive (COM), 
centralized countries (dc) with a strong Centre-Right government (CR) and an effective 
administration (EFF). These ideal conditions for the successful implementation of austerity 
measures were present in Denmark and Finland. For instance, Finland devised a program which 
was aimed merely at “keeping the balance”. Since there was never any need to reestablish 
Finland’s standing on capital markets, the existence of an IMF program was irrelevant for the 
IMF’s evaluation. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the cases score on this solution. Despite the low coverage, we are able 
to explain six out of nine cases of positive evaluation. France is a deviant case, as we will 
discuss below. 
 
-- insert Figure 2 here -- 
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Another four paths imply that the IMF evaluated austerity programs negatively (Table 4). Three 
factors have a particular salience when the IMF rates austerity programs negatively: first, the 
programs should not be overly ambitious; second, low economic competitiveness is often a 
hurdle; and third, the IMF is obviously skeptical when it is not engaged in a country.  
 
-- insert Table 4 here -- 
 
Both paths 1 and 2 suggest that in the absence of direct IMF involvement, the IMF considers 
ambitious programs to be “likely deceivers”. Examples for path 1 are the two austerity programs 
passed in quick succession in Italy under the Berlusconi government and under the Monti 
government, which entailed severe cuts to be implemented swiftly (AMB), but facing 
significant veto power in a decentralized country (DC) without IMF involvement (prg). Low 
problem tractability, Italy’s low ability to structure implementation, and the IMF’s low control 
over the latter lent little credibility to these austerity programs. As an instance for path 2, in 
May 2010, Spain announced that it wanted to reduce its deficit by 3.3 percentage points in no 
more than 19 months (AMB). The highly ambitious program did not convince the IMF: the 
IMF had no direct control or information (prg), political support by the Leftist government 
under Zapatero was weak (cr), and Spain was comparatively uncompetitive economically 
(com).  
The third pathway to a negative evaluation of implementation credibility entails “hopeless 
cases” like the Czech Republic’s 2012 austerity program with a particularly unfavorable 
configuration of conditions, namely: strong decentralization (DC), low effectiveness of state 
administration (eff), low economic competitiveness (com), and no IMF involvement (prg). 
Understandably, the IMF deems the successful implementation of such programs unlikely, 
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irrespective of how ambitious they are.  
The fourth path covers the Irish austerity program as a special, “overly ambitious” case: it 
envisaged a deficit reduction of no less than 28.9 percentage points in 48 months. The IMF 
projected that the program would miss its target by “only” -1.8 points. The presence of a rather 
effective state administration (EFF) combined with low economic competitiveness (com), but 
the program’s exceptionally high ambitiousness was probably decisive for the IMF. Indeed, the 
evaluation could be seen as rather positive. The solution has a high explanatory power, covering 
8 out of 11 negative evaluations (Figure 3). 
 
-- insert Figure 3 here -- 
 
Our proposed framework had a limited capacity to explain the evaluation of austerity programs 
in Western European countries like Austria, Belgium, France and Germany, but also Slovakia. 
Figure 1 has already revealed that, given the wide range of IMF evaluations, regional 
provenience cannot itself be the missing explanation. Based on the IMF country reports, we 
now discuss such “outlier” cases (Rihoux & Ragin 2009; Schneider & Rohlfing 2013) (see 
Table A9 online appendix). 
Austria’s two austerity programs represent the “least explained cases” for negative and positive 
evaluation. As they display an identical country context and the same configuration of 
explanatory factors, we can identify the decisive additional factor through a controlled 
comparison. Austria announced its first austerity program, which aimed at reducing the deficit 
by 2 % within 47 months, in January 2010. The IMF criticized Austria for over-emphasizing 
revenue measures in its plan for fiscal consolidation, and projected that it would miss the target 
by -0.9%, due to negative effects on growth and sustainability. The second Austrian austerity 
program was launched in February 2012 to lower the deficit by 0.6 % within 58 months. The 
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IMF projected that this program would exceed its target by 1.4 %: Austria had proven 
responsive to the IMF’s calls to shift the focus of fiscal policy to the reduction of expenditures, 
now striking an appropriate balance between fiscal discipline and the cyclical needs of the 
economy.  
This comparison suggests that the IMF evaluates countries more positively if they emphasize 
expenditure reduction for achieving fiscal balance, especially during the initial stages of 
adjustment (Broome 2015; IMF 1995: 26). Indeed, the IMF also reacted to the other 
unexplained negatively rated programs with calls for more expenditure containment (France 
2012, Germany 2010). Conversely, the other positively rated deviant cases (Belgium 2012, 
Slovak Republic 2012) were explicitly lauded by the IMF for their focus on expenditure 
containment.  
The French austerity program, announced in August 2011, was rated negatively, despite the 
fact that France is a “model pupil”. The IMF predicted a slight miss of -0.3 per cent (targeted 
reduction: 1.4 per cent in 16 months). The Danish 2010 program and the Finnish 2012 program 
belonged to the same group of “model pupils” and received a positive evaluation. Here, the 
crux of the matter was tax policy. The IMF staff pointed out that the very high French tax 
burden would keep increasing relative to France’s peers. Conversely, the IMF welcomed the 
tax freeze implemented in Denmark and lauded the Finish taxation measures as steps in the 
right direction.  
These comparisons suggest that, particularly in the context of Western European countries, the 
IMF considers not only implementation credibility, but also the austerity programs’ content – 
specifically, their relative emphasis on revenue measures or expenditure reduction. As austerity 
programs often outline this content in broad terms only, the IMF appears also to take past 
experience into account (Heller 2002). 
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Conclusions 
This paper investigated the grounds on which the IMF assessed the prospects for success of 
austerity programs during the European debt crisis. The methodological approach we adopted 
differs from the conventional toolbox of IMF studies, as it focuses on interrelated and 
substitutable, rather than isolated net effects on IMF surveillance. This in turn paves the way 
for an analysis of the causal mechanisms through which IOs influence their member states. 
Simultaneously, our less-than-intermediate-N fuzzy set analysis entails relatively high amounts 
of limited diversity and precludes highly generalizable results, or statements about the size of 
the causal effects. Extensive robustness tests and case knowledge helped us control for 
measurement error (Skaaning 2011). 
Despite these limitations, using Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980) seminal framework, our 
study is the first to show that the austerity programs’ domestic implementation credibility 
heavily influences IMF surveillance (Broome & Seabrooke 2012). First, the IMF requires a 
minimum of institutional capacity to structure implementation to give an austerity program a 
positive evaluation. Second, the problem has to have a minimum level of tractability, either 
because the program is not very ambitious, or because an IMF rescue program is in place. 
Indeed, third, the IMF’s engagement in a country appears to be crucial. The IMF took a more 
skeptical stance when it was not directly involved, particularly if austerity programs were overly 
ambitious and/or the unfavorable implementation context made failure likely. Finally, the IMF 
favored expenditure reduction over revenue measures. These findings cohere with the relevance 
of domestic conditions for IMF-decision-making within the context on conditionality (Broome 
2010; Chwieroth 2013; Stone 2002; Woods 2006).  
This paper has departed from much research on IMF-decision-making by examining the 
specific context of IMF surveillance in developed European countries. One of our main 
motivations was that insights on IMF-decision-making in one context may not be readily 
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transferable to another. We focused on comparable cases which share an internal market, where 
the absence of the option of devaluating the currency enhances the importance of austerity 
programs. In many developing countries, where economic policy is more centralized and less 
transparent than in the European context, the IMF usually gets a closer grip on key actors and 
agencies responsible for implementation (Woods 2006: 82). Accordingly, individual 
‘sympathetic interlocutors’ should be given more attention by the IMF when dealing with 
developing countries (Broome & Seabrooke 2015; Chwieroth 2015; Woods 2006). Moreover, 
considering complementarities between budget policy and institutional configurations in 
different varieties of capitalism may be a promising avenue for future research (Amable & Azizi 
2014; Hall & Soskice 2001).  
Within the scope of our sample, our results suggest that the IMF is a strict guide on the road to 
fiscal adjustment. Particularly in cases where austerity requirements are substantial and must 
be implemented swiftly, the IMF tends not to give positive evaluations if the country is not 
involved in an IMF program. While these patterns are compatible with the “defensive 
forecasting” argument (Aldenhoff 2007; Dreher et al. 2008; Fratscher & Reynaud 2011), our 
overall results suggest that this is as much about implementation credibility and, ultimately, 
about exerting influence as it is about legitimizing lending activities. First, when the IMF’s 
policy advice is backed up with financial incentives for domestic compliance through loan 
programs, it is harder for national authorities to reject the IMF’s reform recommendations 
(Broome 2015: 149). Second, the IMF possesses more information on and control over whether 
a government is serious about enacting “IMF friendly” policy reforms (Broome & Seabrooke 
2012: 2).  
To date, the literature has examined IMF influence predominantly within the context of lending 
activities (Bird 2007; Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Dreher & Gassebner 2012; Steinwand & 
Stone 2008; Stone 2002, 2004). However, our study illustrates that evaluations are a relatively 
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obvious way for the IMF to effectively exert indirect influence on member states via its 
surveillance activities. First, for rather uncompetitive countries with lower institutional 
capacity, it is almost impossible to take the road to fiscal adjustment without the IMF. By 
tendency, countries that need to restore their standing on international capital markets can do 
so only under the IMF’s direct supervision. If countries reject this help, they pay for their 
independence from the IMF with higher country-risk perceptions on capital markets. A higher 
risk perception on capital markets heralds rising refinancing costs, which, in turn, implies 
diminished scope for independent policymaking (Ban & Gallagher 2015). Hence, weak 
countries in need of fiscal consolidation pay the price in terms of sovereignty not only after 
they receive funding from the IMF, but already through the IMF’s evaluation of their fiscal 
position. Second, regardless of any existing IMF program, the IMF also uses its evaluations to 
impose its preferred policy options upon economically less vulnerable countries. This calls for 
further research examining the realm of indirect influence that exists between the IMF and its 
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Tables and Figures 








negative evaluation (pos) 
when… 
Problem tractability  
Highly ambitious program  
AMB no expectation no expectation 
Existence of an IMF program  
PRG present absent 
Ability of the statute to structure implementation 
Highly decentralized political system  
DC Absent present 
Effective state administration  
EFF Present absent 
Non-statutory variables 
Strong Centre-Right government  
CR Present absent 
High economic competitiveness  
COM Present absent 
 
Note: directional expectations denote counterfactual arguments rather than empirically testable hypotheses 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 168-177) 
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Table 2: Measurement and calibration 
 
Set Measurement 




































measures by IMF 
(POS) 
Difference between budget deficit 
reduction targeted by austerity program 
and budget deficit reduction forecast by 
IMF (Fiscal Monitor) -2.4 -0.15 1.4 
Highly ambitious 
program (AMB) 
Required reduction in fiscal balance in per 
cent, divided by duration of program in 
months 0.01 0.1205 0.20 
Existence of an 
IMF program 
(PRG) Dichotomous variable  0 -- 1 
Highly 
decentralized 
political system  




Government Effectiveness partial index of 
the Governance Indicator of Kaufmann et 




Percentage share of Centre-Right parties in 
government (Comparative Political Data 
Set III 1990-2010 by Armingeon et al. 
(2012)) 5 52 95 
High economic 
competitiveness  




Table 3: Sufficient conditions for positive evaluation  
Intermediate
solution amb*PRG*dc*eff  +  PRG*dc*eff*CR  +  amb*dc*EFF*CR*COM  POS 
Single case 
coverage 
GRC3; GRC2,PRT2 GRC2,PRT2; GRC1 DNK,FIN, FRA 
  
Consistency 0.908 0.796 0.848   
Raw 
coverage 0.228 0.269 0.247 
  
Unique 
coverage 0.050 0.092 0.243 
  
Solution consistency 0.831; Solution coverage 0.563 
 
Bold: parsimonious solution (direct causal interpretability).  Italics: deviant case consistency in kind.  
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Table 4: Sufficient conditions for negative evaluation  
Intermediate
solution AMB*prg*DC + AMB*prg*cr*com + prg*DC*eff*com + AMB*EFF*com  pos 
Single case 
coverage ITA2,ITA3; 
GBR;ESP PRT1;ESP ESP;CZE; ITA1 IRL 
 
Consistency 0.969 1.000 0.946 1.000  
Raw 









Solution consistency 0.931; Solution coverage 0.643 
 








Figure 2: Intermediate solution for positive evaluation 
 
Cases situated above the diagonal are consistent. In the upper left quadrant are deviant cases for coverage, in the 




Figure 3: Intermediate solution for negative evaluation 
 
Cases situated above the diagonal are consistent. In the upper left quadrant are deviant cases for coverage, in the 
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AUT1 Austria 01/2010 2013  -0.9 2 47 0.042553191 54 1.89 50 5.13 0 
AUT2 Austria 02/2012 2016 1.4 0.6 58 0.010344828 54 1.89 50 5.14 0 
BEL Belgium 03/2012 2012 0.1 0.4 10 0.04 63 1.59 54.54 5.2 0 
CZE Czech 
Republic 
04/2012 2016 -2.4 3.5 56 0.0625 50 1.01 45.45 4.52 0 
DEU Germany 06/2010 2014 -1.8 4.5 54 0.083333333 60 1.55 100 5.37 0 
DNK Denmark 05/2010 2013 0.7 1.6 43 0.037209302 42 2.29 100 5.46 0 
ESP Spain 05/2010 2011 -0.9 3.3 19 0.173684211 58 0.98 0 4.59 0 
FIN Finland 03/2012 2016 0.3 1.4 57 0.024561404 45 2.24 100 5.47 0 
FRA France 08/2011 2012 -0.3 1.4 16 0.0875 42 1.44 88.41 5.13 0 
GBR United 
Kingdom 
05/2010 2014 -3.7 10.5 54 0.194444444 49 1.56 100 5.19 0 
GRC1 Greece 05/2010 2014 0.5 10.6 55 0.192727273 31 0.52 73.73 4.04 1 
GRC2 Greece 05/2011 2015 0.2 4.4 54 0.081481481 31 0.52 73.73 3.99 1 
GRC3 Greece 02/2012 2015 1.4 3.9 46 0.084782609 31 0.52 36.84 3.92 1 
IRL Ireland 12/2010 2014 -1.8 28.9 48 0.602083333 41 1.31 86.28 4.74 1 
ITA1 Italy 09/2010 2012 -0.5 2.1 26 0.080769231 50.
6 
0.52 100 4.37 0 
ITA2 Italy 08/2011 2013 -1.5 4.3 28 0.153571429 50.
6 
0.52 100 4.37 0 
ITA3 Italy 12/2011 2013 -1.5 4 24 0.166666667 50.
6 
0.52 100 4.43 0 
PRT1 Portugal 11/2010 2011 -1 2.7 13 0.207692308 42 1.04 0 4.38 0 
PRT2 Portugal 05/2011 2014 0 2.6 31 0.083870968 42 1.04 66.67 4.4 1 
SVK Slovak 
Republic 
05/2012 2013 0.1 1.2 19 0.063157895 36 0.88 0 4.19 0 




Table A2: Descriptive statistics of raw variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Skew 
Pos -3.70 1.40 -0.58 -0.40 1.29 -0.49 
Amb 0.01 0.60 0.12 0.08 0.13 2.52 
Prg 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.44 1.07 
Dc 31.00 63.00 46.14 47.00 9.49 -0.08 
Eff 0.52 2.29 1.19 1.04 0.59 0.35 
Cr 0.00 100.00 66.28 73.73 35.62 -0.70 
Com 3.92 5.47 4.70 4.55 0.51 0.09 




Table A3: Fuzzy data 
Case POS AMB DC EFF CR COM PRG 
AUT1 0.27 0.11 0.93 0.91 0.47 0.87 0.00 
AUT2 0.95 0.05 0.93 0.91 0.47 0.87 0.00 
BEL 0.62 0.10 1.00 0.80 0.54 0.91 0.00 
CZE 0.05 0.18 0.75 0.26 0.40 0.15 0.00 
DEU 0.10 0.27 0.99 0.78 0.96 0.97 0.00 
DNK 0.83 0.10 0.25 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.00 
ESP 0.27 0.88 0.98 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.00 
FIN 0.70 0.07 0.39 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.00 
FRA 0.45 0.29 0.25 0.71 0.92 0.87 0.00 
GBR 0.01 0.94 0.68 0.78 0.96 0.91 0.00 
GRC1 0.77 0.94 0.03 0.02 0.82 0.02 1.00 
GRC2 0.66 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.82 0.01 1.00 
GRC3 0.95 0.28 0.03 0.02 0.28 0.01 1.00 
IRL 0.10 1.00 0.21 0.61 0.91 0.35 1.00 
ITA1 0.39 0.26 0.79 0.02 0.96 0.08 0.00 
ITA2 0.15 0.77 0.79 0.02 0.96 0.08 0.00 
ITA3 0.15 0.85 0.79 0.02 0.96 0.10 0.00 
PRT1 0.25 0.96 0.25 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.00 
PRT2 0.57 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.73 0.09 1.00 




Table A4: Analysis of necessity 
 Positive evaluation (POS) Negative evaluation (pos) 
Condition  Consistency  Coverage RoN Consistency  Coverage RoN 
AMB 0.432 0.437 0.695 0.661 0.840 0.889 
DC 0.519 0.442 0.623 0.719 0.769 0.800 
EFF 0.573 0.578 0.751 0.510 0.647 0.783 
CR 0.746 0.500 0.505 0.768 0.647 0.592 
COM 0.531 0.550 0.748 0.465 0.604 0.771 
PRG 0.345 0.612 0.885 0.174 0.388 0.831 
amb 0.842 0.664 0.699 0.558 0.552 0.635 
Dc 0.729 0.674 0.769 0.478 0.556 0.710 
eff 0.650 0.514 0.617 0.667 0.662 0.699 
Cr 0.473 0.618 0.836 0.407 0.668 0.854 
com 0.617 0.479 0.590 0.654 0.637 0.673 
prg 0.655 0.387 0.352 0.826 0.613 0.463 
dc + EFF 0.971 0.610 0.517 - - - 
amb + PRG 0.959 0.608 0.523 - - - 
cr + amb1 0.906 0.601 0.555 - - - 
AMB + DC1 - - - 0.909 0.735 0.63 
Bold: Condition passes consistency threshold of 0.9.  
1No necessary condition: at least one deviant case consistency in kind. 
A consistent necessary condition is deemed trivial if coverage is below 0.6 and the RoN value is below 0.5. We 
tested for all possible supersets of POS and pos. Only complex necessary conditions meeting the consistency and 
triviality criteria are listed in the table. 
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Table A5: Truth table for outcome “POS” 
AMB DC EFF CR COM PRG POS Consistency PRI Cases 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.000 1.000 GRC3 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.885 0.771 GRC2,PRT2  
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.841 0.691 DNK,FIN,FRA 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.838 0.704 GRC1 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.819 0.589 AUT1,AUT2 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.720 0.438 BEL,DEU 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.718 0.371 SVK 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.633 0.001 ESP 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.607 0.041 ITA1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.585 0.001 PRT1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.582 0.058 CZE 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.519 0.000 GBR 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.458 0.000 IRL 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.434 0.000 ITA2,ITA3 
Raw consistency threshold: 0.837 (next highest 0.819; AUT1 is a deviant case consistency in kind). 
Complex solution: amb*dc*eff*com*PRG + dc* CR*eff*com*PRG + amb*dc* CR*EFF*COM*prg  POS 
(solution consistency 0.831, solution coverage 0.563). 
Parsimonious solution (without exclusion of untenable assumptions): eff*PRG + amb*dc*CR  POS (solution 
consistency 0.782, solution coverage 0.640). 
Untenable assumptions: dc*EFF + AMB*prg  POS (contradicts statement of necessity). 
Enhanced parsimonious solution (under exclusion of untenable assumptions): amb*dc* CR + dc*eff*PRG  POS 
(solution consistency 0.786, solution coverage 0.640). 




Table A6: Simplifying assumptions for analysis of POS  
AMB DC EFF CR COM PRG 
Easy counterfactual 
(used for intermediate 
solution? 
0 0 0 0 1 1 X 
0 1 0 0 0 1 - 
0 1 0 0 1 1 - 
1 0 0 0 0 1 - 
1 0 0 0 1 1 - 
1 1 0 0 0 1 - 
1 1 0 0 1 1 - 
0 0 0 1 0 0 - 
0 0 0 1 1 0 - 
0 0 0 1 1 1 X 
0 0 1 1 0 0 - 
0 0 1 1 0 1 - 
0 0 1 1 1 1 X 
0 1 0 1 0 1 - 
0 1 0 1 1 1 - 
1 0 0 1 1 1 X 
1 1 0 1 0 1 - 
1 1 0 1 1 1 - 
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Table A7: Truth table for outcome “pos” 
AMB DC EFF CR COM PRG pos Consistency PRI Cases 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 1.000 IRL 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1.000 1.000 ITA2,ITA3 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1.000 1.000 GBR 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.000 0.999 PRT1 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.976 0.934 ESP 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.974 0.942 CZE 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.923 0.811 ITA1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.782 0.562 BEL,DEU 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.740 0.411 AUT1,AUT2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.700 0.329 SVK 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.594 0.259 GRC1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.583 0.190 DNK,FIN,FRA 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.496 0.000 GRC2,PRT2  
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.458 0.000 GRC3 
Raw consistency threshold: 0.0.922 (next highest 0.782; BEL is a deviant case consistency in kind). 
Complex solution: DC*eff*com*prg + AMB*eff*cr*com*prg + AMB*dc*EFF*CR*com*PRG + 
AMB*DC*EFF* CR*COM*prg  pos (solution consistency 0.965, solution coverage 0.638). 
Parsimonious solution (without exclusion of untenable assumptions):  
The present data display tied logically redundant prime implicants and hence, a certain degree of ambiguity. Both 
models are reported below (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 108ff). The two solutions are identical, except for 
the role of com and eff, respectively in the last path. We opt for M2 because of its higher consistency and coverage. 
The intermediate solution is identical for both models. 
M1: AMB*EFF + AMB*prg + DC*com  pos (solution consistency 0.925, solution coverage 0.682). 
M2: AMB*EFF + AMB*prg + DC*eff  pos (solution consistency 0.930, solution coverage 0.687). 
Untenable assumptions: amb*dc* CR + dc*eff*PRG  pos (contradicts statement of sufficiency for POS, 
enhanced parsimonious solution). 
Enhanced parsimonious solution (under exclusion of untenable assumptions): amb*dc* CR + dc*eff*PRG  POS 
(solution consistency 0.786, solution coverage 0.640). 
M1: AMB*EFF + AMB*prg + DC*com  pos (solution consistency 0.925, solution coverage 0.682). 
M2: AMB*EFF + AMB*prg + DC*eff  pos (solution consistency 0.930, solution coverage 0.687). 





Table A8: Simplifying assumptions for analysis of pos (M2) 
AMB DC EFF CR COM PRG 
Easy counterfactual 
(used for intermediate 
solution)? 
0 1 0 0 0 1 - 
0 1 0 0 1 0 - 
0 1 0 0 1 1 - 
1 0 0 0 1 0 - 
1 0 1 0 0 0 X 
1 0 1 0 0 1 X 
1 0 1 0 1 0 - 
1 0 1 0 1 1 - 
1 1 0 0 0 1 - 
1 1 0 0 1 0 X 
1 1 0 0 1 1 - 
1 1 1 0 0 0 X 
1 1 1 0 0 1 X 
1 1 1 0 1 0 X 
1 1 1 0 1 1 - 
0 1 0 1 0 1 - 
0 1 0 1 1 0 - 
0 1 0 1 1 1 - 
1 0 0 1 0 0 - 
1 0 0 1 1 0 - 
1 0 1 1 0 0 X 
1 0 1 1 1 0 - 
1 0 1 1 1 1 - 
1 1 0 1 0 1 - 
1 1 0 1 1 0 X 
1 1 0 1 1 1 - 
1 1 1 1 0 1 X 
1 1 1 1 0 1 X 








Table A9: Post-QCA case discussions 
Case Type of case Comparison with Question 
AUT2 Most deviant case for 
coverage with positive 
evaluation  
Case with similar 
configuration of conditions 
and negative evaluation:  
AUT1 
Which additional condition 
distinguishes AUT2 from 
AUT1, fostering a positive 
evaluation? 
AUT1 Most deviant case for 
coverage with negative 
evaluation 
Case with similar 
configuration of conditions 
and positive evaluation:  
AUT2 
Which additional condition 
distinguishes AUT1 from 
AUT2, fostering a negative 
evaluation? 
FRA Deviant case consistency in 
kind: configuration of 
conditions should imply 
positive evaluation, but did 
not 
Cases with positive 
evaluation, members of the 




condition(s) do these cases 
not display and fostered a 
negative evaluation in 
France? 




Online Appendix B: Calibration and robustness test 
With the exception of the condition PRG, we used the direct method of calibration, which 
applies a logistic function to assign the raw data to the different qualitative categories 
partitioned by the qualitative anchors 0.95 (fully present), 0.5 (point of indifference) and 0.05 
(fully absent) (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 35-39). The most important anchor is the 
crossover point (0.5): if a change in this anchor leads to a case displaying a qualitatively 
different membership in the set, then this can change its membership in the truth table rows 
and, hence, the substantial results (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 287-291). Conversely, 
changing the thresholds for full (non-)membership does not affect truth table row membership 
and, hence, the substantial results (Skaaning 2011). Below, we outline the calibration decisions 
and possible alternative crossover points. For complexity reasons, robustness tests are restricted 
to the complex solution. They involved the following steps for each indicator set and the 
outcome set (see Table B1): 
1. Do the theoretical/ conceptual criteria leave room for doubt when defining the crossover 
point? 
2. If yes, what is the conceptually meaningful alternative possible crossover point that still 
complies with the theoretical argument (Skaaning 2011: 395)? 
3. Are there any empirical cases situated within the range of the old and the new crossover 
point (Figure B1), and if so, how many?  
4. If yes: does changing the crossover point, ceteris paribus applying the calibration in Table 
2, alter  
a) The cases’ distribution in the condition or outcome set such that the set is so 
skewed that it poses severe analytical problems (see Schneider & Wagemann 
2012: 232-250)? We consider this as given if the proportion of cases with 
membership > 0.5 is ≤ 25%, or ≥ 75%; or if the new set is much more 
unfavorably skewed, as compared to the original set. 
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b) If no: The substantial results of the analysis of necessity (in terms of a new 
necessary condition, or a previous one disappearing)? 
c) One or several cases’ membership in the truth table rows? 
d) The setting of the raw consistency threshold, in terms of different truth table 
rows being coded as (not) sufficient for the outcome? The detailed decisions for 
setting the raw consistency thresholds are documented in the attached R code. 
5. If yes: how does this affect the results of logical minimization?  
a) Does this yield a different complex solution? For the sake of simplicity, we do not assess 
the robustness of the intermediate solution or parsimonious solution.  
b) If yes: is the new solution term in a super- or subset relation with the original solution 
term? If the new complex solution term is not a subset of the original intermediate or 
parsimonious solution term, then the new intermediate and parsimonious solution terms 
will be different, too. The deviant results are reported in Table B2. 
c) Which calibration scenario is to be preferred? See criteria in legend of Table B1. 
 
Positive evaluation of austerity program by IMF. We consider the IMF’s evaluation of the 
austerity program to be positive when the IMF considers the program to at least meet its target, 
which is expressed by index values of zero or more. The crossover point is set between 0 and 
the least negative evaluation (-0.3) at -0.15. No alternative crossover point can capture the 
meaning of this rating. We then coded the most extreme cases as fully in or out, respectively 
(full membership 1.4, full non-membership -2.4, as Great Britain (-3.7) seems to be an outlier).  
Highly ambitious program (AMB). Rather than evaluating an “objective” ambitiousness of 
austerity programs, it can be assumed that the IMF assesses the relative ambitiousness of the 
programs. We hence adopt a relative perspective and code the two most ambitious programs 
(Portugal 1 and Ireland, which is an extreme outlier with a value of 0.6) as fully in (0.2), and 
the least ambitious program as fully out (0.01). For the crossover point, we choose a remarkable 
gap in the values, which almost double from 0.087 (FRA) to 0.15 (ITA2) (crossover point in-
between at 0.1205). Alternatively, the relative perspective could be expressed by using the 
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sample mean as a crossover point – which also happens to be 0.12, meaning no case will be 
concerned. 
Strongly decentralized political system (DC). Ideal-typical situations of “full” or “non-existent” 
autonomy are never observed in reality. Furthermore, degrees of decentralization must be 
interpreted relative to other countries. Accordingly, the empirical distribution of the cases, as 
well as in-depth case knowledge guided the choice of calibration anchors. The calibration 
should reflect “generally accepted notions in the social sciences” (Schneider & Wagemann 
2012: 32) as to what constitutes a decentralized country. The anchor for full-membership is set 
at 55 to exclude Austria and include Spain, since Spain, Belgium and Germany are widely 
considered to be the only “real” federal countries in our sample. Countries with “intermediate” 
decentralization values are Czech Republic (50), UK (49), Finland (45), Denmark (42) and 
France (42). To establish a difference in kind between rather strong versus rather weak 
decentralization, the sub-index “Financial Decentralization” is arguably decisive in determining 
the veto power of sub-national units. The more financial issues are in the hands of sub-national 
units, the less room for maneuver remains for central governments to implement austerity 
measures. Czech Republic (rank 8) and UK (rank 11) rank considerably higher than Finland 
(rank 15) and France (rank 16) in terms of financial decentralization. Hence, the crossover point 
needs to be established at 47 - exactly between UK and Finland. Alternatively, the crossover 
point could be set to the sample mean (46.14) to express relatively high vs. relatively low 
degrees of decentralization. The anchor for full non-memberships is set at 33.5, exactly between 
Greece and Slovakia: according to the country profiles, Greece is much more centralized than 
Slovakia and Ireland. 
Effective state administration (EFF). The absolute index scores have no meaning other than 
positioning the country with respect to other countries. Hence, the scores of individual countries 
can only be interpreted relative to other countries’ scores. Large gaps in the cases’ distribution 
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indicate that there is a significant (qualitative) difference in administrative efficiency between 
two countries. Hence, the full-membership anchor (2.065) is established between Finland (2.24) 
and Austria (1.89), and the anchor of full non-membership (0.7) between Slovakia (0,88) and 
Greece (0,52). Another significant gap between Ireland (1.31) and Portugal (1.04) separates the 
more effective Western European administrations from the less effective Southern and Eastern 
European administrations (crossover point 1.175). Alternatively, the sample mean (1.19) could 
serve as a crossover point to express a fully relative perspective on administrative effectiveness 
being above or below average. 
Strong Centre-Right government (CR). The share of government-posts held by Centre-Right 
candidates can be considered large enough to exert significant influence on policymaking and 
implementation if a decisive majority of more than 50% of government posts is held by Centre-
Right candidates. The crossover point is set at 52% due to a gap in the empirical values. The 
crossover point could alternatively be set at 49% to express the idea of a “blocking minority” 
rather than a decisive majority. The anchor for full membership is set at 95% to ensure that only 
cases in which there is not a single (potentially influential) ministerial post held by a Christian- 
or Social-Democrat are considered in full. The anchor for full non-membership is set at 5%, 
where the presumed influence of the Centre-Right on the implementation of austerity policies 
can be considered negligible.  
High economic competitiveness (COM). The competitiveness scores represent a ranking. 
Individual scores do not display any objective meaning, but can only be interpreted with regard 
to other scores. Larger gaps imply larger ranking differences. The anchor for full membership 
(5.285) is set exactly between Finland/Denmark/Germany, which have top rankings, and 
Belgium/UK, which have good, but not exceptional rankings. We set the anchor for non-
membership (4.28) in between Slovakia (which, together with Greece, ranks very low), and 
Italy, which is in a more intermediate cluster together with Portugal. For the crossover point 
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(4.86), we identify a qualitative difference between France (5.13) and Ireland (4.59). The 
country profiles reveal that Ireland’s ranking in two aspects crucial for economic 
competitiveness – quality of the infrastructure and capacity for innovation – is decidedly 
inferior to that of France (France ranks 4 and 8; Ireland 69 and 31). Alternatively, the crossover 
point could be set at the sample mean (4.7) adopting a purely relative perspective. This 
calibration leads to a recoding of Ireland from non-competitive to competitive. It produces a 
solution which is identical in three of four paths and covers the same cases. The only difference 
is that high competitiveness contributes to a negative evaluation in two, instead of one, paths. 
Since this result intuitively makes much less sense, we opted for the original calibration. 




Figure B1: Calibration and raw scores distribution 
 
 
Dotted lines indicate alternative crossover points that were tested. 
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POS NO -0.15  45      YES 
AMB YES 0.1205  35      YES1 
AMB2  0.12 0 35       
DC YES 47  50      YES1,2 
DC2  46.14 0 50       
EFF YES 1.175  45      YES1,2 
EFF2  1.19 0 45       
CR YES 52  65      YES4 
CR2  49 2 75       
COM YES 4.86  40      YES2,3 
COM2  4.7 1 45 NO YES YES YES NO  
PRG NO   25      YES 
1The non-preferred calibration does not result in a different qualitative classification of the cases and hence will 
not affect the substantial results. 
2The non-preferred calibration unnecessarily contradicts recommendations of good practice (e.g. using descriptive 
statistics for calibration although theoretical criteria exist, or interpreting numeric values although they are not 
qualitatively meaningful (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). 
3The set or the results derived from the alternative calibration have a less meaningful interpretation than the 
preferred set. 





Table B2: Deviant results of robustness tests (sufficiency) 
 Complex solution Consistency Coverage Super-/subset of 
old solution term 
COM2 DC*eff*com2*prg + AMB*eff*cr*com2*prg + 
AMB*dc*EFF* CR*COM2*PRG + 
AMB*DC*EFF* CR*COM2*prg  pos 
0.970 0.611 No 
Deviant results are marked bold. 
